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Abstract 
Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) have the potential to offer safer and more efficient transportation. However, such 
vehicles operate in complex heterogeneous environments and it is therefore essential to control the dynamic risks that the CAVs 
face during operation. Given that CAVs can be seriously impacted by cyber-attacks, their security issues have been investigated 
widely.  However, existing approaches fail to adequately consider the dynamicity of the risks that arise and present methods to 
capture the changes in risks and adaptive mitigations. To bridge these gaps, this paper proposes a systematic approach, which 
comprises of three modules: a knowledge-based system to support the identification of the critical threats, a monitoring module 
to detect the changes in security context of the CAV and its surrounding environments, and a simplified assessment module to 
capture the dynamic risks and adjust the mitigations as needed. We investigate a case study of CAV platooning to evaluate our 
proposal.  
1. Introduction 
Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled CAVs can deliver better and 
new services to society. However, recent safety incidents from 
Tesla or Uber have raised the suspicion of whether this 
technology can safely and effectively replace conventional 
vehicles in the near future [1]. To gain public acceptance, 
CAVs require significantly more rigorous testing, verification, 
and especially risk control.  
A CAV can be considered as a cyber-physical system which 
includes driving software supported by many embedded 
sensors (such as GPS, radar, LIDAR, ultrasonic) to sense the 
driving environments combined with actuators. Its awareness 
can also be extended by communicating with other entities, 
such as transportation infrastructure (V2I) and surrounding 
vehicles (V2V), to provide a shared understanding. It is known 
that cyberattacks can manipulate the CAV’s sensors, software, 
and its external communications, to cause harmful effects. As 
such, cybersecurity risk assessments for CAV systems are 
becoming increasingly important. 
Many works have addressed CAV risk assessment issues by 
considering vulnerabilities in the cyber physical technologies 
that CAVs employ. They also present different security 
objectives such as safety, privacy, financial or operational that 
require satisfying. Since CAVs operate in evolving 
heterogeneous environments, the security risks that they face 
are also dynamic. For example, a CAV can enter a new place 
where attackers with different goals and capabilities may 
launch some previously unknown attacks. Moreover, CAVs’ 
functionalities can also be affected by environment conditions, 
which cause changes to the capabilities of the security system. 
Therefore, security assessment of CAVs should also be 
dynamic to capture these changes. However, challenges arise 
due to the complexity arising from the disparate fields of 
development [2], and the lack of support of the current 
methods for context awareness.    
In this work, we develop a simplified approach to address the 
dynamic nature of cyber security risk in CAV systems, which 
focuses on identifying the most critical attacks that require 
monitoring and controlling as the environment changes. 
Contextual security information is communicated between the 
CAV and infrastructure to reflect the security situations during 
mobility. Our approach also gives flexibility for security 
assessment and adjustable mitigations as needed.  
Our main contributions are:  
 We propose a simplified approach to identify the most 
critical threats faced by CAVs’ through monitoring the 
security context of both the CAVs and the environments 
they operate in. The contexts are analysed with the help of 
a knowledge-based system that extracts the most critical 
threats on which to focus.   
 We propose a method to manage the dynamic risks, which 
include a lightweight strategy to reduce the need for risk 
reassessment. We also specify the need for reconsidering 
the mitigations when there are new risks or new road 
conditions that affect the CAV functionalities.  
 We present a case study to compare dynamic and static 
risk assessment approaches.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background and presents a review of related work in CAV 
cyber security risk assessment. Section 3 discusses the 
requirements for an efficient dynamic risk assessment 
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approach, before Section 4 presents the proposed solution.  In 
Section 5 we present and examine a case study for dynamic 
risk assessment in CAV systems, namely in platooning. 
Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses the future work. 
2. Background and Related Work  
Two of the most well-known CAV security assessment 
guidelines are the SAE J3061 Cybersecurity Guidebook for 
Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems [3] and the ENISA 
Cybersecurity and Resilience of Smart Cars [4]. SAE J3061 
suggests a framework which relies on three risk assessment 
methods, including EVITA [5], TVRA [6], and HEAVEN [7], 
with similar processes to the Road Vehicle Functional Safety 
ISO 26262 [8]. In contrast, the ENISA method describes the 
possible threats and vulnerabilities of assets based on the 
typical architecture of smart vehicles.  
The common risk assessment approaches try to list all the 
potential threats and assess their risks through the estimation 
of likelihood and impact. To prevent the possibility of 
overlooking potential attacks, many works apply systematic 
threat modelling techniques to the CAV system assets, which 
includes all the CAV components and communications [9-11]. 
The method often used by these works is STRIDE [12], a 
threat modelling method proposed by Microsoft. There are 
also efforts to extend the STRIDE model to capture more 
threats, for example, the work in [13] added the Linkability and 
Confusion category to the STRIDE methodology. Each 
threat’s likelihood will be assessed through considering the 
attackers’ capabilities and motivations, which assume that if 
an attack is easy to launch and attackers have motivations to 
launch it then its likelihood will be high, and vice versa. On 
the other hand, the impact of an attack is categorised into four 
aspects, including safety, privacy, financial and operational. 
For each aspect, different impact levels are defined. The final 
risks of each threat will be derived from reference tables, 
which will give risk level given the likelihood and impact 
inputs.  
Systematically listing all the threats that apply to CAV assets 
can result in a large number of threats that can be difficult to 
assess and control. To reduce these complexities, the EVITA 
approach [5] has been employed to link the threats, threat 
agents, and goals through the use of attack trees. Overall, the 
majority of works in the literature try to address the large 
attack surfaces arising from different CAV technologies, but 
there is no efficient method to quickly address the critical 
threats (i.e. threats with high likelihood and high impact) when 
applying in specific systems, especially in dynamic security 
contexts.   
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) can be employed to 
monitor, record, and analyse security information of any 
transportation environment. Selected information can be 
exchanged to and between CAVs to extend their cyber security 
awareness of the environment that they are operating in. The 
coordination between ITS and CAVs will clearly support the 
ability to perform dynamic risk assessment, however, no 
method has been proposed to develop such assessments. We 
believe we are among the first to discuss a framework for the 
coordination between the CAVs and ITS for security analysis 
through risk profiles [14]. It should be noted that ITS can also 
be utilised to provide information for analysing privacy risks, 
as shown in [15].  
In the next section, we will present some essential 
requirements for a dynamic risk management approach to 
bridge the aforementioned gaps. 
3. Requirements of CAV Dynamic Risk 
Assessment 
The essential capabilities of an efficient dynamic risk 
management approach for CAV are to:  
 Address high-risk (critical) threats effectively: the 
ultimate aim of risk assessment after knowing all the 
possible options is to identify the high-risk threats (i.e. 
attacks with high likelihood and high impact). An efficient 
method to address these critical threats is needed to save 
security resource and to increase the reaction speed of the 
CAV, especially to handle dynamic risks. 
 Capture the changes of risks when the CAVs move to 
new environments: the approach should establish the 
point in time when reassessments are required, and 
specify how to react to the dynamic nature of risks. 
 Allow the coordination with the transportation 
infrastructure (that is, the ITS) to extend the CAVs’ 
cyber security awareness.  
 Manage and control dynamic risks at different levels 
and from different aspects [14].  
In the next section, we will propose our approach to address 
these requirements. 
4. Proposed Solution  
We assume that the roads are clustered into different 
transportation environments and for each environment, there 
will be a corresponding infrastructure to manage the 
information regarding its security context. This information 
can be referred to as the security profile [14], which ideally 
should include the potential threats, their frequency and 
potential impact. Additionally, the infrastructure can maintain 
maps with pre-annotated information concerning road 
conditions, which can be used to examine the influence on 
typical CAV functionalities (e.g. reflective objects that may 
affect the radar or LIDAR functioning). The infrastructure can 
communicate this information through information exchange 
services such as the Basic Safety Messages (BSM) described 
in [16]. 
Our solution consists of the three modules as illustrated in 
Figure 1. Briefly, module A supports the CAVs to analyse the 
security context, module B monitors the changes to check 
whether to launch the risk management process, which is the 
responsibility of module C.  
Details of the modules are presented as follows. 
4.1. Module A: Knowledge-based System 
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Figure 1. The proposed dynamic risk assessment model for CAV 
The knowledge-based system should comprise of the 
following essential parts regarding the security knowledge:  
 A reference architecture for CAV operation: As most 
of the cyberattacks target the functionalities of a system 
(e.g. to create disruption or system abuse), the security 
assessment should start from understanding the system’s 
intended functionalities and how they can be attacked. 
Ideally for this purpose, security analysts will need to be 
provided with a system architecture, which is “the 
descriptive representation of the system’s component 
functions and the communication flows between these 
components” [17]. This architecture needs to cover all the 
CAV’s essential components and functionalities to 
support the functional analysis of any specific CAV 
system. As such a full reference architecture can provide 
the context of where the CAV system sits within the 
Internet of Vehicles system of systems. While there exist 
different reference architectures for CAVs [5, 10, 18, 19], 
they either failed to consider some critical functions of the 
system or the scope is too broad or too detailed, leading to 
difficulties in application. We have therefore developed a 
new reference architecture that focuses specifically on the 
areas that allow effective security analyses. As CAV 
technologies are still being developed, this reference 
architecture will need to be maintained. 
 A comprehensive attack surface analysis of the 
reference architecture: information of security threats 
(likelihood and impact of testing, and a record of real 
attacks) are collected and grouped according to the 
components, functions, and communications in the 
reference architecture. For example, reported cyber 
physical attacks regarding the sensors (camera, LIDAR, 
radar, etc.) are recorded and annotated at the relevant 
components. The aim of maintaining the attack surface 
knowledge is to support effective cross-referencing of any 
relevant vulnerabilities for all components. 
 Typical attack goals and sub-goals: the exploitation of 
attack surfaces is linked to the typical attack goals, which 
are represented through the attack tree. Attack trees allow 
to trace back the motivations behind the attack and to 
check the conditions whether the attackers can achieve 
their goals. 
 Threat agent analysis: this includes a list of potential 
threat agents, their goals and capabilities. This 
information can be obtained from the literature but needs 
to be reviewed periodically to ensure it is up-to-date. The 
threat agent analysis allows an understanding of the 
motivations, methods and capabilities of the attackers 
when exploiting the attack surfaces.  
Note that the knowledge-based system also collects 
information regarding the relationships between the parts (see 
Figure 2), represented through the attack trees [5]. For 
example, a threat agent will have typical attack goals, which 
are aimed to disrupt specific CAV functionalities (sub-goals). 
The likelihood of achieving a sub-goal can be retrieved from 
the attack surface information that lists the vulnerabilities of 
the corresponding components. On the other hand, when an 
attack is detected, the system will be able to determine the 
likely relevant goals and further techniques that are required to 
reach these goals. This information can suggest the threat 
agents behind this attack. Checking the profiles of these threat 
agents (i.e. goals and capabilities), the system can predict other 
high likelihood attacks that have not yet occurred (i.e. similar 
attacks caused by the same agent).  
The knowledge-based system can support and shape the focus 
of security analysis from different levels such as components, 
functionalities, threat agents, or stakeholders. For example, to 
analyse a system with specific components and functions, the 
knowledge-based system can suggest a reduced list of threats 
to focus, instead of the large number of threats derived from 
traditional threat modelling. Given this reduced list, analysis 
of the intersections between the stakeholders’ interest and 
attackers’ goals will help to further identify the most critical 
threats among the others. 
The knowledge-based system is also responsible for 
monitoring and communicating the real time security context 
of environment to CAVs that are in transportation. Typical 
information includes recent threats or incidents reported by 
monitoring system or other CAVs; potential threat impacts; 
and environment or location conditions that may create impact 
to CAV functionalities. This information will be useful to 
suggest mitigation update to adapt with security incident that 
happens.
Reference Architecture
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Hacktivists
Operators
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Manipulate CAV 
operations 
Steal the CAV
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Steal the CAV 
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Tracking
...
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Stop the CAV
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Slow down the CAV
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Falsify logged data
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Disable safety control
Open door
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 .
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Figure 2. The knowledge-based system of security risk assessment 
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4.2. Module B: Context Monitoring 
Before operation, the initial security risks and corresponding 
mitigation plan of the CAV will be obtained from the security 
requirements (i.e. the combination of stakeholders’ security 
interest such as essential functions) and knowledge of potential 
threat agents. When the CAV is in operation, module B is 
responsible for monitoring the contextual information from the 
infrastructure and the state of the CAV. When receiving 
information from new environments, it will compare with the 
previous contexts to detect changes that need to be forwarded 
to module C to process. Potential changes include: changes in 
threats (either be informed by infrastructure or be detected by 
the CAV itself through its intrusion detection system), changes 
in requirements (from infrastructure or from CAV 
stakeholders), or changes in internal functionalities (such as 
road conditions that affect the CAV functionalities informed 
by the infrastructure; or changes in the driving algorithms). 
When detecting these changes, module B will pass the 
corresponding information to module C for reassessment. On 
the other hand, if the new information does not imply any 
changes, it is not necessary to invoke module C. 
4.3. Module C: Risk Management  
This module comprises of five steps to manage risk inputs 
from module B as can be seen in Figure 1. Note that Step 1 and 
2 are independent so they can be conducted in any order, and 
in parallel.  
Step 1: Identify the potential attacks. Given the security 
context provided by the infrastructure, module C can derive 
the potential attacks with the support of module A. In case 
there is no information about the threat agents, for example if 
there is no reported attack in the environment, our system 
suggests that the attack likelihood can be considered to be very 
small, hence, the risks can also be considered low. Note that 
this suggestion only reflects security knowledge at assessed 
time and it does not mean that the system is free from risks. 
Our design gives stakeholders flexibility to monitor other 
attacks that they concern (such as attacks which have high 
impact upon stakeholders’ knowledge) by adjusting their 
security requirements (see module B). However, too much 
monitoring can deplete security resources and impact on the 
reaction speed of the system. Moreover, in case of incidents, 
the system can still quickly update the context and 
communicate around the area to reduce the impacts. 
Step 2: Identify the CAVs’ essential components. The 
essential components are specified based on an understanding 
of the CAV operations. Note that the selection of essential 
components is dependent not only on the physical architecture, 
but also on the software. Two CAVs with the same physical 
design can still have different essential components due to the 
differences in the driving algorithms. For example, both CAVs 
are equipped with the same sensors but one CAV may rely on 
the GPS when driving, while the other CAV may depend on 
the predictions of trajectory and a local map. In such cases, the 
components that are in use will be essential. Stakeholders can 
also select their own components for monitoring if these are 
essential for them.  
Step 3: Identify the critical attack surfaces to monitor. This 
step combines the results of the first two steps to select critical 
threats. In particular, only attack from Step 1 that target the 
essential functions identified in Step 2 will be considered. 
Other attacks which target the non-essential components (low 
impact attacks), or other components with no potential attacks 
(low likelihood attacks) are considered low risk, so they can 
be skipped for simplicity.  
Step 4: Conduct risk assessment on the critical attack 
surfaces. It is difficult to identify threat agents, however, as 
their activities and behaviours (e.g. launched successful 
attack) are recorded by ITS, it is possible to justify their 
capabilities. In [5], attacker capabilities are assessed through 
five fundamental factors, including elapsed time, attacker 
expertise, knowledge of system, windows of opportunities, 
and equipment. To launch a specific attack successfully, 
attackers need to bypass the system withstand (defender 
capabilities), which are also represented by the same factors 
[10]. As a result, the successful attacks can suggest the 
potential of the attackers without the needs of knowing their 
types.  
The following part will describe our method to justify the 
attacker capabilities. Assume that for a specific area, the 
system records a list of n successful threats T = {ti, i=  1, 𝑛} 
launched by m unknown attackers A = {aj, j = 1, 𝑚 }. For each 
threat ti in T, the ITS knows the corresponding defender 
capability vector DCi = [𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑒𝑡  𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑒𝑥  𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑘  𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑤  𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑒𝑞] which 
represents the system withstand regarding elapsed time, 
expertise, knowledge, windows of opportunities, and 
equipment respectively. Similarly, assume that each attacker j 
will have capability vector of ACj = 
[𝐴𝐶𝑗
𝑒𝑡  𝐴𝐶𝑗
𝑒𝑥 𝐴𝐶𝑗
𝑘 𝐴𝐶𝑗
𝑤 𝐴𝐶𝑗
𝑒𝑞]. In the worst case scenarios, 
attackers can collaborate to improve their potential. As a result, 
instead of identifying capabilities for all attackers, we only 
need to estimate the maximum capabilities of all attackers in 
the group, which can be represented by GA: GA = [𝐺𝐴𝑒𝑡  
𝐺𝐴𝑒𝑥  𝐺𝐴𝑘  𝐺𝐴𝑤  𝐺𝐴𝑒𝑞] in which 𝐺𝐴𝑓  = 
max
𝑓∈{𝑒𝑡,𝑒𝑥,𝑘,𝑤,𝑒𝑞};𝑗=1,𝑚
{𝐴𝐶𝑗
𝑓}. To launch Ti successfully, the 
attackers should be able to bypass the system withstand for Ti, 
which means their group attack capability GA should be 
greater than defender capabilities DCi:   𝐺𝐴
𝑒𝑡 ≥ 𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑒𝑡 , 𝐺𝐴𝑒𝑥 ≥
𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑒𝑥 , 𝐺𝐴𝑘 ≥ 𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑘 , 𝐺𝐴𝑤 ≥ 𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑤 , 𝐺𝐴𝑒𝑞 ≥ 𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑒𝑞
. For 
simplicity, we will assume that the capability of attacker at the 
time of launching Ti successfully equal to the system 
withstand. We consider attacker capability a dynamic risk  
element which is assessed by attack records. Consequently, 
this element can be updated if more sophisticated attacks are 
being detected during operations. Therefore, given n 
successfully launched threats, the maximum attacker 
capability can be estimated as GA = max
𝑖=1,𝑛
{𝐷𝐶𝑖 } = [𝐷𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑡  
𝐷𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑥  𝐷𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑘  𝐷𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑤  𝐷𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑞 ] in which 𝐷𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓
 = 
max
𝑓∈{𝑒𝑡,𝑒𝑥,𝑘,𝑤,𝑒𝑞};𝑖=1,𝑛
{𝐷𝐶𝑖
𝑓}. Information regarding attacker 
capabilities in each area are maintained by the corresponding 
ITS. For risk assessment, this information will be provided to 
every CAV in  transportation.   
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A common strategy to monitor dynamic risks is to reassess 
whenever there are changes in risk inputs. When the CAV is 
moving, reassessment may be needed frequently, which can 
compromise security resources. To prevent that, the CAV can 
pre-define thresholds which indicate the level of risks that it 
can tolerate. When coming to a new area, it will only reassess 
the risks if attacker capability in this area pass the pre-defined 
thresholds. Similarly, if attacker capability in the new area is 
less than that of the previous area while the CAV was 
confident of controlling the risks in the previous area, 
reassessing risks will be not necessary because risk level is not 
increased. 
Step 5: Re-evaluate the mitigations. New mitigations should 
be considered to add in case there are new risks. Moreover, 
when the new environments inform the road conditions that 
may affect certain CAV functionalities, the mitigations that are 
related to these functions also need to be revised.  
In the next section, we will present a case study that employs 
our approach to manage the dynamic security risks.  
5. Case Study  
The scenario in this case study is built based on the use case 
presented in [20]. We also obtained relevant knowledge of 
CAV functionalities, attacks and potential impacts from this 
reference.  
5.1. Scenario Description 
We consider a CAV that moves in a platoon, which is operated 
under Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC). A 
typical CACC includes GPS, radar sensors, and Dedicated 
Short Range Communication (DSRC) devices to communicate 
with other CAVs in the platoon [20]. The platoon operations 
are illustrated in Figure 3. In particular, the radar sensors are 
used to measure the distance between the subject vehicle and 
its preceding vehicle; the GPS provides the location of other 
adjacent vehicles; while the DSRC devices are utilised for 
communication with nearby vehicles [20]. The platoon is 
moving on a road as represented in Figure 4. The goal is to 
manage the dynamic security risks when the subject CAV (the 
red vehicle in the platoon in Figure 4) moves in the road. 
Figure 3. The operation of CCAV in platooning [20]
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Figure 4. A platooning scenario for dynamic risk assessment 
The road XY can be divided into three areas: (XA), (ABCD), 
and (DEY). Assume that each area has a Road Side Unit (RSU) 
to communicate its security context to the subject CAV. 
Essential security information for communicating includes a 
list of attacks that need to be considered (i.e. attacks with high 
likelihood according to history record or attacks with high 
impact if happen in the area) and road conditions that may 
affect the CAV functionalities. The RSU will need to update 
the context information by constantly collecting and analysing 
real time reports from different entities such as CAVs 
operating in the area or monitoring sensors along the road. The 
BSM [16] can be extended to store and deliver the security 
context information to all the CAVs that are in transportation. 
In this example we may have that the security contexts of the 
three areas are: (XA) No particular cyber threat to be 
concerned (e.g. the area has no record of cyberattacks or 
incidents); (ABCD) There is concern of spoofing attacks on 
LIDAR (e.g. these attacks have happened recently); (DEY) 
There is concern of spoofing attacks on ultrasonic sensors (e.g. 
these attacks were recorded with high frequency).  
5.2. Static Versus Dynamic Risk Assessment 
Static risk assessment approaches give no clear guidelines of 
which attack surfaces to focus. Furthermore, the threat agents 
are unknown and therefore, it is not clear how to identify their 
capabilities to estimate the risks. Any initial risk assessment of 
the CAV will remain constant during the time it moves on the 
road since there are no guidelines of when and how to update 
the assessment.  
We now apply our approach for dynamic risk assessment. We 
will use knowledge regarding the attack trees to predict the 
relevant attacks and system withstands to estimate attacker 
capabilities. An example of the attack tree can be shown in 
Figure 5, while the system withstands for attacks in this tree 
are shown in Table 1. Assume that the CAV is only interested 
in safety (module B). It is obvious that the essential 
components to focus on are radar and GPS (Step 2 in module 
C).  
In (XA), as there is no attack of concern and the system 
suggests that the risk up to the assessed time can be considered 
to be very low.  
In (ABCD), given the spoofing attacks on LIDAR, the 
knowledge-based system suggests that attackers aim to spoof 
nearby objects, which is part of a larger aim of slowing down 
the CAV (e.g. see the attack tree in Figure 5). On the other 
hand, LIDAR spoofing is the only attack that is recorded, 
therefore we assume that attacker capabilities equal to system 
withstand for this attack, which is [1 3 0 0 4] as can be seen in 
Table 1. We will need to look for attacks which are not only 
have the same aim, but also can be launched with the assumed 
capabilities. From Figure 5 and Table 1, we can obtain camera 
spoofing, tampering, and DoS (attacks 7, 8, 9 in Table 1); 
LIDAR jamming attack (attack 6); and GPS jamming (attack 
13). Given the vehicle specification, only attack 13 targets one 
of its critical components, which is GPS. While there are other 
critical attacks such as radar spoofing, tampering, and 
jamming (attack 1, 2, 3) and GPS spoofing (attack 12); these 
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attacks require higher attacker capabilities, therefore will be 
less feasible. Note that this does not mean the CAV is risk-free 
from those attacks, however, once any of them are launched, it 
can be detected and reported to ITS to update the attacker 
capabilities for future analysis. On the other hand, the spoofing 
attack on LIDAR and other attacks on camera will not be 
considered because it targets non-critical components in 
current operation.  
Similarly, in (DEY), we found that the threat agent in (DEY) 
also aims to spoof the nearby object, or ultimately to slow 
down the vehicle, however attacks on the ultrasonic sensors 
require much higher capability of attackers, in which the 
capability vector is [10 6 7 0 7]. With such a high capability, 
the threat agents can be able to launch a number of attacks such 
as radar spoofing and jamming (attack 1,3), camera spoofing, 
tampering, and DoS (attack 7, 8, 9), and GPS jamming and 
spoofing (attack 12, 13). However, only attacks which target 
critical components (i.e. GPS and radar) will be added to the 
critical attack list.  
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Figure 5. Example of an attack tree regarding the physical sensors  
Table 1. Assessing system withstands for cyber-physical attacks on 
CAV – scales follow the scales in [5], assessments are based on [21-
24]. ET = elapsed time; EX = expertise; K = knowledge; W = 
windows of opportunities; EQ = equipment.   
ID Threat name System withstand 
ET EX K W EQ 
1 Spoofing radar 10 6 7 0 7 
2 Tampering radar 17 6 7 0 7 
3 Jamming radar 10 6 7 0 7 
4 Spoofing LIDAR 1 3 0 0 4 
5 Tampering LIDAR 10 3 7 0 7 
6 Jamming LIDAR 1 3 0 0 4 
7 Spoofing Camera 0 0 0 1 0 
8 Tampering Camera 0 0 0 1 0 
9 DoS Camera 0 0 0 1 0 
10 Spoofing ultrasonic 10 6 7 0 7 
11 Jamming ultrasonic 10 3 3 0 4 
12 Spoofing GPS 4 3 3 0 4 
13 Jamming GPS 1 3 0 0 1 
Table 2. Dynamic risk assessment for CAV platooning  
Road Risk Assessment 
(XA) Very low security risk 
(ABCD) GPS jamming: High risk (high likelihood and 
high safety impact according to [20]) 
(DEY) GPS jamming and spoofing: high risk 
Radar jamming and spoofing: high risk 
The dynamic risk assessment results are summarised in Table 
2 above.  
5.3. Mitigation Strategy Consideration  
Assume that the two best mitigations when the jamming 
attacks are launched are: m1 - switch to the trajectory 
prediction to predict and update the GPS location while 
continuing to run as normal, and m2 - slow down and stop the 
car. We will evaluate the three following mitigation strategies: 
the first two utilise static mitigations and the last one utilises 
the dynamic mitigations approach. 
 Strategy S1–non-stop: uses m1 during the trip  
 Strategy S2–stop: uses m2 during the trip  
 Strategy S3–dynamic: use either m1 or m2 depending on 
the awareness of the security risks and road conditions 
The risk assessments when implementing these three strategies 
are shown in Figure 6 below.  
Risks of different mitigation strategies
S1 - Non stop S2 - Stop S3 - Dynamic
A B C D E
VH
L
RoadStraight Curve Straight Curve
M
Severity
Straight
Figure 6. Comparisons of static and dynamic mitigation strategies 
when attacks are launched 
The explanations are as follows.  
For S1–non-stop, when the platoon runs in the straight lanes 
from A to B or from C to D, the errors of the trajectory 
prediction is small due to simple trajectory (a straight line). If 
a GPS jamming attack is detected, the CAV will switch to the 
local positioning therefore the likelihood and risk of crash is 
low. However, when the platoon runs in the curved lanes such 
as the road from B to C or from D to E, errors can become 
more critical, raising the risk of accident when the vehicle goes 
out of lane and hits a vehicle from the opposite lane. Therefore, 
the risk of a crash in these parts are high.   
For S2–stop, when the platoon runs in the curved lanes such as 
the road from B to C or D to E, the platoon tends to slow down 
in the curve, therefore the risk of being crashed into by the rear 
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vehicle can be considered medium. However, when a jamming 
attack occurs in straight lanes such as the road from A to B or 
C to D, according to [20], there is a high chance of a crash 
caused by the rear vehicle because the reactions of the brake 
are not fast enough. Therefore, the crash risks in these cases 
are high.   
For S3–dynamic, at first, the CAV applies m1 in the straight 
lane AB. Before getting to B, the CAV will be informed of the 
curve lane ahead by RSU-2. Given that it is aware of the 
unreliability of the trajectory predictions when in curved lanes, 
and that it has knowledge that the jamming attack risk is high, 
the system will re-evaluate the mitigation strategy. The result 
is that m2 is the best mitigation to choose, therefore it can 
switch to m2. Similarly, when moving to another straight lane 
CD, the changes of road conditions will invoke the mitigation 
re-evaluation so the CAV can always select the mitigation with 
minimal risk.  
5.4. Discussions 
In this section we discuss in what extent our approach is 
feasible with the requirements stated in Section 3. 
Addressing the critical threats: the case study shows that our 
approach can quickly spot high-risk threats, which are having 
high likelihood and targeting the essential components. 
However, our approach relies on a knowledge-based system, 
which is subjective and requires maintenance to update with 
relevant knowledge. We have also employed a simplified 
approach to predict relevant attacks based on assumptions of 
the threat agent goals and capability. The precision of the 
attack predictions can be improved through more sophisticated 
methods (e.g. see [25]), but will also require more detail 
regarding the environments with more computational trade-
off. Besides this, the critical threats that we specify may be 
more useful for short-term rather than long-term analysis, 
where some non-critical threats can be the first step to launch 
more severe attacks.  
Capturing the risk changes: our approach can capture 
dynamic risks through monitoring the changes in the 
environment context, the CAVs’ state, and the interest of 
stakeholders. The CAVs are quickly aware of the risk changes, 
the dynamic risk management can be lightweight, while the 
changes can be reflected in the mitigation strategies.  
Coordinating between the CAVs and infrastructures: we 
identify the essential information to communicate between the 
CAVs and the infrastructures, which include the record of 
attacks, potential threat agents, their typical goals, attack 
methods, and road conditions which may affect the CAV 
functionalities. Moreover, the infrastructures, which have 
global views in traffic and security incidents along the roads, 
can manage the risks through sending certain requirements to 
improve the security of the CAVs (e.g. require more focus on 
specific attack surface). On the other hand, the CAVs can also 
report to the infrastructure any attacks that they detect during 
the trip for the benefit of other CAVs. Some important issues 
that still need to be considered are the quality (e.g. when the 
infrastructure has significant traffic due to a high number of 
communications) and the reliability (e.g. spoofing) of the 
communication.   
Managing and controlling risks at different levels, from 
different aspects: different stakeholders can influence the risk 
control by including their risk interest for the CAV to monitor. 
For example, if passengers require protection their privacy 
then the system will monitor the extra risks from the CAV 
components that can be vulnerable for privacy leakage (the 
reasoning will be based on the knowledge-based system).  
6. Conclusion and Future Work  
This paper introduces a simplified approach to manage the 
dynamic cyber security risks in CAVs’. The system that has 
been developed proposes a knowledge-based system for 
reasoning the critical attack surfaces, as well as the relevant 
threat agents and attack goals which target the CAVs. We then 
propose a design to coordinate communication and 
information sharing between transportation infrastructure and 
the CAVs, to detect the changes in context. We have presented 
a module to manage the dynamic cyber security risks, 
including the consideration of planning optimal mitigations. 
We have also considered a case study of CAV in platooning, 
to emphasise the advantages of dynamic risk assessment over 
the existing static approaches.  
We anticipate that some of our future work will be to develop 
more uses of the knowledge-based system on the security 
analysis, and to extend this research in simulation environment 
for further verification.  
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